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The recent global economic crisis has illuminated the need to open up the ‘black box’ which 
surrounds our understanding of the adaptive capacities of regional actors in the face of 
recessionary crises and how these relate to economic resilience. This paper contributes to 
this endeavour by developing a complex adaptive systems (CAS) framework for under-
standing who has agency within regional economies, how agency functions, and specifically 
what shapes how agents adapt, respond and react to crises. Using the case study of Wales, 
we draw on insights from CAS thinking to highlight the importance of conceptualising this 
agency in relation to the opportunities and capacity for action, and the co-evolutionary 
behaviour of agents within their regional contexts.
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Introduction
The post-2007 economic downturn has high-
lighted the vulnerability of many regional 
economies to international shocks, and drawn 
attention to differences between regions in 
their capacity to adapt accordingly (Davies, 
2011; Fingleton et  al., 2012; Gardiner et  al., 
2013). Indeed, one of the most striking features 
of the recent economic crisis in Europe is that 
in spite of its contagious nature and widespread 
impact, the diffusion of its effects has been 
highly geographically uneven (Martin, 2011). 
The crisis is recognised to have taken various 
forms in different national and regional con-
texts, with a number of studies highlighting the 
importance of contingent structural conditions 
in shaping the nature of its effects in different 
places. Thus, nations and regions with greater 
economic and political integration into global 
financial markets were hardest hit, as were 
those that had experienced greater reliance on 
foreign investments and exports (Davies, 2011; 
Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2014).
This emphasis upon structural factors has 
also featured in the developing theorising 
around economic resilience, an increasingly 
prominent analytical concept and heuristic 
device for examining the capacities of local 
and regional economies to withstand and 
recover from economic shocks, and adapt their 
development paths accordingly (Martin, 2012). 
Thus, analyses of the determinants of resilience 
have tended to focus upon the structures of 
regional economic systems whether through 
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understanding how inherited production struc-
tures shape the sensitivity of regions to reces-
sionary shocks (Hill et al., 2011; Martin, 2012), 
or how these structures exhibit distinct phases 
of change in a manner akin to complex eco-
logical systems such as panarchy (Simmie and 
Martin, 2010). While valuable in illuminating 
the path-dependent and evolutionary nature 
of regional economies, this system and struc-
ture emphasis has resulted in much less atten-
tion being paid to understanding the role of 
human agency in the adaptation at the heart 
of this conceptualisation of resilience (Bristow 
and Healy, 2014). This is problematic however. 
An overt emphasis on structures will inevita-
bly lead to a focus on identifying generic fea-
tures of resilient economic ‘systems’ and will 
ultimately tell us little about the means by 
which resilience can be achieved and, specifi-
cally, what actions and interventions might be 
critical (Pain and Levine, 2012). In short, resil-
ience will have less traction analytically unless 
we can move to better understand who has 
capacity to adapt within regions and how.
The recent global economic crisis has 
thrown into sharp relief the need to open up 
the ‘black box’ of agency or ‘the processes 
through which regional actors protected 
their regions from or responded to down-
turns caused by economic shocks’ (Hill et al., 
2011, 61). It has highlighted that when con-
fronted with a broadly similar economic crisis 
or shock, policy makers in different regions 
and nations often respond in very different 
ways and at different speeds. In particular, as 
well as significant variations in the nature and 
timing of fiscal stimulus and austerity meas-
ures deployed across European nations, there 
is also evidence of considerable variation in 
the extent to which government responses 
have exhibited a regional dimension (Davies, 
2011). This raises numerous questions about 
what shapes and constrains different crisis 
responses by policy makers, whether these 
responses are adaptive or transformative, and 
how these responses work to either ‘nurture’ 
or ‘undermine’ resilience (Cowell, 2013; 
Swanstrom, 2008).
Furthermore, the recent economic crisis 
has revealed that it is not just the agency 
of policy makers that is significant. The cri-
sis has also highlighted the significant, often 
instrumental, role played by the strategic 
decisions and behaviours of businesses (Hill 
et  al., 2011). When faced with a shock and 
falling demand, firms commonly respond in 
the short term by cutting back on employ-
ment in order to realise savings through 
reduced costs of personnel. However, there is 
increasing evidence that labour hoarding is a 
preferred strategy for certain firms depend-
ing upon their age, size, sector and geograph-
ical context (Holm and Ostergaard, 2014; 
Moeller, 2010). Moreover, other research 
suggests that the solidarity and altruistic 
behaviour characterised by firms within 
clusters provides an important social factor 
mediating coping strategies and ultimately 
providing greater resilience through crisis 
(Wrobel, 2013). This implies that agency does 
not simply reside with sovereign authorities 
or equate to narrow rationalities or entirely 
autonomous actions and behaviours. Human 
agency is both broad and distinct in the man-
ner in which it can act to postpone or delay 
the effects of crisis, anticipate and recognise 
risks, and take positive, transformative steps 
to overcome (Davidson, 2010).
All of this suggests that if we are to under-
stand what makes some regions more resilient 
to economic disruptions than others, then we 
need to understand how and why some regions 
and their constituent actors or agents respond 
more quickly and effectively in the face of 
economic shocks and take positive purposive 
action (Cowell, 2013; Martin, 2012), whereas 
other regions fail to adapt or act quickly in 
response to change (Hill et  al., 2011). It also 
suggests the need to confront issues of choice 
and behaviour or, as Turner puts it, “to under-
stand how different people actually make deci-
sions in different circumstances” (Turner, 2012, 
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93). More specifically, it implies the need to bet-
ter understand how and why the decisions and 
adaptive behaviours of different types of agents 
might vary spatially according to their particu-
lar economic, social and institutional contexts.
This is clearly a challenging task. The pur-
pose of this paper is to contribute to this 
agenda in two main ways: firstly, to emphasise 
the need for and importance of understanding 
what agency is and what shapes how agents 
respond to crises and demonstrate adaptive 
agency; and secondly, to argue that in theo-
ries around complex adaptive systems (CAS), 
we have a promising conceptual framework 
and new way of thinking to help progress this 
agenda. The paper is thus intended to build 
on the conceptual work of those who have 
argued for an agency perspective on resilience 
(for example, Bristow and Healy, 2014; also 
Davidson, 2010; Skerratt, 2013). More spe-
cifically, it focuses on understanding how the 
choices and responses of agents are shaped 
within the messy complexity of real world 
spatial economies, and to reflect upon how 
this adaptive agency relates to economic resil-
ience. It is thus exploratory in nature, but is 
intended to help enhance thinking about resil-
ience and approaches to studying it, and to act 
as a stimulus to further debate.
The paper is now organised as follows. The 
next section explores the relevance of CAS 
thinking to regional economies and its impli-
cations for the conceptualisation of resilience. 
This is followed by a section that seeks to 
develop this thinking by considering criti-
cal questions around the meaning and role 
of agency in social systems such as regional 
economies. The paper then explores empirical 
evidence on responses to the recent economic 
crisis in the devolved region of Wales, to illus-
trate emergent patterns of adaptive behav-
iour in crisis responses and to explore how 
they have been shaped. The paper concludes 
by exploring what this means for our under-
standing of resilience, and establishes critical 
questions for further research.
Regional economies, CAS and 
resilience
CAS thinking is a broad body of work which 
recognises that the world is comprised of mul-
tiple, inter-related systems, whether physical, 
biological, chemical or social. These systems are 
characterised by complex non-linear dynamics 
and an adaptive capacity that enables them to 
re-arrange their internal structure spontane-
ously whether in response to an external shock 
or to some internal, self-organised criticality 
(Berkes and Folke, 1998; Beinhocker, 2007; 
Ramalingam and Jones, 2008).
CAS thinking has increasingly been applied 
to understanding regional economies and 
innovation systems, notably with an evolution-
ary biology inflection (Cooke, 2012). This has 
found qualified support for the relevance of 
key tenets of CAS thinking to the function-
ing and development of regional economies. 
Thus, for example, regional economies are 
increasingly understood to be characterised 
by non-linear and non-equilibrium dynamics 
where firms, institutions and their spatial con-
texts co-evolve (Boschma and Martin, 2010; 
Martin and Sunley, 2006, 2007). This non-line-
arity creates path dependence or local rules of 
interaction which means outcomes evolve as a 
consequence of the region’s own history, but 
in an adaptive rather than deterministic form 
(Martin and Sunley, 2012). Regional economies 
also appear to exhibit elements of emergence 
whereby macro-level structures or patterns of 
behaviour such as cities and business clusters, 
arise endogenously and spontaneously out of 
the micro-level interactions of economic agents 
and their environment (Krugman, 1996; Martin 
and Sunley, 2012). Thus, “just as a living crea-
ture is more than the sum of the individual cells 
which make up its body, so the economy and 
society are more than the sum of the individu-
als who inhabit it” (Ormerod, 1998, x).
CAS thinking has also been utilised to 
develop understanding of regional economic 
resilience, or whether and how regional 
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economic ‘systems’ respond to shocks and 
stresses. In contrast to the engineering concep-
tion of resilience which focuses on the resist-
ance of a system to shocks and the speed of its 
return or ‘bounce-back’ to a pre-shock state 
or equilibrium, a CAS perspective leads to an 
adaptive, dynamic notion of resilience, defined 
as the capacity of a regional economy to adapt 
to the changing technological, market and com-
petitive pressures and opportunities facing it 
(Cooke, 2012). Regional economic resilience 
from this perspective is conceived as a multi-
dimensional property embracing not only 
recovery from the shock and resistance (the 
ability of regions to resist disruptive shocks 
in the first place), but also re-orientation (the 
extent to which the region adapts its economic 
structure), and renewal (the degree to which 
the region resumes its pre-shock growth path) 
(Martin, 2012).
This developing conception of resilience, and 
its theoretical and political implications, has 
become the subject of increasing critique how-
ever. In particular, CAS theorising has been 
criticised for its tendency to naturalise shocks 
and change with MacKinnon and Driscoll 
Derickson (2013, 258)  arguing that “both the 
ontological nature of ‘the system’ and its nor-
mative desirability escape critical scrutiny.” 
Welsh (2014) articulates similar concerns over 
the tendency for an adaptive conception of 
resilience to reify the adaptability and flex-
ibility of agents to the system and ignore the 
wider political and economic relations impact-
ing upon regional outcomes and positioning. 
This, he argues, carries the attendant risk of 
creating resilience discourses which are situ-
ated in and help reproduce broader neoliberal 
practices of self-organisation in response to 
uncertainty and change. It is also increasingly 
apparent that there is no clear consensus as to 
how resilience should be defined and assessed, 
such that it is regarded by some as “self-evi-
dently common sense and yet conceptually and 
programmatically elusive” (Pain and Levine, 
2012, 3). Fundamentally, this reflects a tendency 
to conflate and confuse resilience as a perfor-
mance outcome, an adaptive capacity or pro-
cess, and an agenda (Bristow and Healy, 2014).
As a counter to this critique however, oth-
ers argue that CAS theorising does not in and 
of itself give a justification for neoliberalism or 
particular political ends. In particular, several 
authors have argued that resilience cannot be 
treated as a necessarily desirable concept espe-
cially where resilience capacities are associ-
ated with outcomes which are not progressive 
or transformative (Bristow and Healy, 2014; 
Pain and Levine, 2012). Similarly, in a detailed 
exposition of the potential utility of complex-
ity science to international development policy 
and humanitarian aid, Ramalingam and Jones 
(2008) argue that complex social systems are 
likely to be characterised by a whole range 
of emergent structures and patterns, some of 
which may not necessarily be ‘good’ for all indi-
viduals who are part of them. Critically they 
assert that understanding the different goals, 
strategies, interests and political trajectories 
of human agents in different settings is key to 
understanding their emergent properties in 
complex social systems. In terms of understand-
ing regional responses to economic shocks, this 
implies the need to blend what CAS theories 
tell us about agent behaviour in complex sys-
tems, with what we know or are beginning to 
understand about the economic decision mak-
ing of human agents. It is to this that this paper 
now turns.
Conceptualising agency
The who and what of agency
Recent debates have begun to enhance our 
understanding of both what agency is and who 
has agency within regions. Contributions within 
the field of labour geography, specifically in rela-
tion to the terms of engagement of place-based 
workers with global capitalist relations, have 
taken significant steps towards conceptualis-
ing agency as a dynamic and yet highly contin-
gent process. Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011), for 
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example, define agency as intentional, purpose-
ful and meaningful actions or strategies that 
work to shift the capitalist status quo in favour 
of workers. They argue that labour agency has 
a number of spatial and temporal aspects and 
as such, always needs to be understood in rela-
tion to its context-specific relationships with 
the state, community and labour market inter-
mediaries. Similarly, in a study of workers in 
Glasgow, Cumbers et al. (2010) identify agency 
as contingent upon particular circumstances 
and processes in time and space, but argue 
that workers are neither necessarily victims or 
pawns in relation to capital. In focusing on the 
daily struggles of workers and their families 
to ensure their own social reproduction, they 
instead distinguish between the prosaic, every-
day mechanisms through which people simply 
‘get by’, and activities which allow people to 
create independent spaces free of subordina-
tion to capitalist social relations. Importantly, 
they establish that this agency need not nec-
essarily always be defined in response to capi-
tal’s strategies. Furthermore, they point to the 
decline of social agency around the workplace 
and a greater emphasis upon the household, 
identifying the increasing variety of creative 
strategies to sustain and enhance overall house-
hold incomes.
There are clear parallels to be drawn between 
these studies and the CAS perspective on 
agency, although CAS thinking yields valuable 
additional insights. In particular, in complex 
systems, agency is conceived as a recursive pro-
cess of adaptive behaviour with agents reacting 
to both internal and external stimuli including 
each other and the wider system. Thus, adap-
tive agency is not simply confined to purpose-
ful action to transform the system or change 
the status quo or an autonomous response to 
an external shock or crisis, but is essentially the 
dynamic capacity that actors have to adapt to 
changes in their environment and the behav-
iour of others. They may of course choose not 
to adapt and to resist change. The critical point 
is that the adaptive nature of their agency and 
its potential for transformative outcomes will 
depend, in part at least, upon the assessment 
they make of the threat to their survival posed 
by the changing environment and the responses 
of others (Senge, 1990).
As such, the scope for adaptive agency is 
highly contingent upon a complex mix of con-
text, environment and local norms (Berkes 
and Folke, 1998). In social systems such as 
regional economies, the inherited socio-spatial 
structures of the social and economic environ-
ment provide the overarching constraints upon 
action. Thus, as suggested by Giddens (1984) 
in his structuration theory, structures shape 
agent behaviour and are in turn moulded by 
their decisions. Furthermore, these are shaped 
by context with different regions having dif-
ferent ‘opportunity spaces’ (Swanstrom, 2008, 
4), that is, different economic, legal and insti-
tutional conditions which expand or constrict 
the opportunities for actors to respond. This 
leads us to recognise that even if the ways by 
which agents respond to crisis are similar, their 
means and effects are likely to be mediated by 
the unique contingencies of context and the 
path dependencies of previous decisions. As 
Ormerod (1998, 182)  puts it, “even if individ-
ual rules of behaviour are known exactly, the 
resulting behaviour of the system still cannot be 
predicted and controlled in a precise manner”.
CAS thinking also suggests that while all 
individuals in the system exhibit this adaptive 
agency, groups or teams will tend to act as the 
fundamental learning unit and driver for behav-
ioural responses (Senge, 1990). Thus, while CAS 
are made up of hundreds of autonomous agents 
with the freedom to make any number of 
choices for action in response to any particular 
event, they tend to appear collectively highly 
organised and behave in an almost ‘herd-like’ 
manner (such as crowds in a football stadium). 
Ormerod (1998) illustrates the relevance of this 
to economies using the example of consumer 
behaviour at Christmas. When a new product 
is released on to the market, consumers do 
not know in advance whether they will like it. 
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People have to learn what their own prefer-
ences are, and the choice of any individual is 
influenced powerfully by the opinions and 
actions of others. Thus “popular toys or films 
become even more popular precisely because 
they are popular” (Ormerod, 1998, x). Powerful 
group forces also emerge through group-cen-
tred goals and behaviours, not simply imitation 
(Akerlof and Shiller, 2009).
Adaptive agents’ behaviour within a system 
has been characterised in a number of ways 
(Ramalingam and Jones, 2008). Some adap-
tive agents will be ‘weak’ and simply react to 
environmental conditions, while others will be 
‘strong’ and be both reactive and goal-oriented. 
This will reflect their information process-
ing and decision-making capabilities as well 
as their sense of time, available opportuni-
ties, choice and risk (Davidson, 2010; Pain and 
Levine, 2012). Other strong agents may also 
seek to plan or exert control over the environ-
ment. Strong agents will tend to have beliefs, 
desires and intentions that influence their plans 
for future behaviour. As such, they are more 
capable than weak agents of attempting to 
carry out purposeful, goal-oriented behaviour 
(Ramalingam and Jones, 2008). In turn, strong 
agents may constrain the choices and actions 
of weak agents through their control of knowl-
edge and resources, and their resulting capacity 
to exert influence through unequal and con-
tested power relations (Haas, 1992; Pain and 
Levine, 2012).
The co-evolution of agency
Perhaps the most significant value of the CAS 
perspective is indeed in its insight that it is 
the interaction between agents (and groups of 
agents) which is critical. It is agent interactions 
which create the self-organised criticality or 
highly adaptable state of a complex system (Bak, 
1996). It is acknowledging and understanding 
these interactions which, perhaps constitutes 
the biggest step forward in our understand-
ing of regional economies and their adaption 
processes, and, ultimately, the biggest challenge 
for empirical research. The agents are co-evolv-
ing, constantly adapting to each other and to 
their environment such that their optimal out-
comes are interdependent and dynamic—their 
choices influence each other and they depend 
on each other’s success (Eidelson, 1997). In this 
co-evolutionary process, “the adaptive land-
scape of one actor heaves and deforms as the 
other actors make their own adaptive moves” 
(Kauffman, 1993, 238).
Analysing and understanding these dynam-
ics is clearly challenging not least because com-
plex systems function through the interaction 
of complex agent behaviours operating at dif-
ferent scales and time frames and not through 
one-way causal relationships. These behav-
iours have powerful feedback effects, such that 
understanding how they work to reinforce or 
counterbalance one another to affect patterns 
of agency becomes critical to understanding the 
capacity to respond effectively to challenges 
(Senge, 1990). Crucially, however, these inter-
actions and patterns of agency are often most 
clearly discernible after a substantive instabil-
ity. System wide shocks provide a critical dis-
juncture around which changes in patterns 
of behaviour are most readily distinguished 
(Eidelson, 1997). Moreover, disturbance “has 
the potential to create opportunity for doing 
new things, for innovation and development” 
(Folke, 2006, 253). This suggests that enquir-
ies into agent responses to crisis should look 
to identify the sites at which opportunities for 
new or ‘mutant’ agent behaviours and system 
dynamics are generated (Davidson, 2010). 
Global economic shocks thus appear to pro-
vide an opportune moment to discern patterns 
of agency and their interdependencies within 
regions in comparative context.
In terms of regions, it is thus the interactions, 
ostensibly the social relationships between eco-
nomic agents, which become crucial in under-
standing how shocks play out and whether and 
how adaptation occurs. Human behaviour is 
intrinsically influenced by contagion effects or 
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the behaviour of those that we are in contact 
with, typically our family, friends and colleagues 
(Ormerod, 2012) and as such, it is increasingly 
recognised that when it comes to economic 
matters “our decisions depend on the responses 
of others and on what we anticipate these 
responses will be” (Kay, 2010, 139). This col-
lective context is one reason underpinning the 
non-linearity observed in social systems. It also 
explains the importance of our expectations 
of the future and how these can be informed, 
shaped and reinforced by those around us. How 
economic agents narrated the global economic 
crisis, for example, played a critical role in medi-
ating its effects (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). The 
behaviour and decisions of key forums of col-
lective agency, whether firms, workers or the 
state, thus has to be understood in relational 
terms and with respect to their networks in all 
their manifold complexity, connectedness and 
spatial variety (as Dicken et al., 2001).
In terms of what shapes these co-evolution-
ary interactions between groups of economic 
agents, it is the cultural and communicative 
resources governing patterns of agency that 
are important. Critically, these interactions 
are guided by human rules and norms which, 
owing to the constraints of limited informa-
tion and following insights from behavioural 
economics, effect bounded rationality in deci-
sion making. In addition, bounded willpower 
acknowledges that agents at times find it diffi-
cult to make decisions that will benefit them in 
the long-term. As such, heuristics, framing and 
loss aversion shape the choices and decision-
making methods of economic agents and influ-
ence the choices of those around them (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008).
These heuristics tend to be shared and shaped 
collectively within local contexts. The network 
view of the world articulated through a CAS 
perspective inherently gives rise to the concept 
of collective action and behavioural influences. 
If a set of rules spread across a network, the 
behaviour of the individual component parts 
is influenced by these emergent, collective 
rationalities for action. The spread of culture 
and attitudes in places can therefore be just as, 
and possibly even more important, than stand-
ard economic considerations in accounting for 
particular problems such as entrenched patterns 
of worklessness and inactivity (Ormerod, 2012). 
Human behaviour is, in part at least, shaped by 
social influence (where our behaviour conforms 
to group norms), and social learning (the level 
of evidence available to us, how we learn from 
each other and from our mistakes). Yet all too 
often in regional research and policy action, the 
importance of the dominant ‘mind set’ and its 
critical role in stifling or fostering the formation 
of a reflexive culture capable of promoting stra-
tegic goal-oriented behaviour has been over-
looked (Amin, 1999).
CAS thinking asserts that in the case of weak 
(reactive) agents, their adaptive behaviour will 
be driven entirely by the interactions with other 
actors. For strong (cognitive) agents, interac-
tions may still be important but their internal 
cognitive structures, beliefs and perceptions of 
opportunities and risks will also be significant 
in influencing their adaptive behaviour and 
that of others (Ramalingam and Jones, 2008). 
This suggests that the presence of strong actors 
plays a critical role in shaping the social norms 
and rationalities for action influencing agents’ 
behaviour in regions. It also reinforces the 
importance of the narrative and communicative 
tools used by policy makers and others to frame 
events and changes in the environment, influ-
ence expectations about future opportunities 
and risks, and cultivate collective actions (Kay, 
2010). Furthermore, these framings become all 
the more important in times of crisis and in the 
development of collective responses. Crises are 
likely triggers for new or alternative behaviours 
although, critically, these will be shaped by the 
dominant ideas circulating between agents at 
the time. As Friedman (1962, 2)  states “only 
a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real 
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that 
are taken depend on the ideas that are lying 
around”.
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Crisis responses and adaptive 
agency: evidence from Wales
This paper now explores empirical evidence 
from Wales on the nature of adaptive agency in 
an economic crisis and its shaping by powerful 
social norms, socio-spatial context and co-evo-
lutionary behaviour by firms, households and 
policy makers. This evidence is derived from a 
study examining territorial resilience, with data 
drawn from a series of interviews with policy 
makers, business representatives and other 
stakeholders, and from a detailed synthesis of 
secondary data, policy and other documentary 
evidence. We focus on understanding adapta-
tion in terms of employment responses to the 
recent economic crisis since this provides a 
clear point of connection with debates around 
place-based agency (see the previous section) 
and labour market adaptations. It also provides 
a clear focus for interrogating the role of co-
evolutionary behaviours of economic agents in 
constituting each other’s activities and choices. 
This inevitably provides only a partial picture 
of adaptive responses to the crisis in Wales, 
but nonetheless provides an important contri-
bution to both opening up adaptive agency in 
crisis responses, and developing the more local-
ised and qualitative approach to resilience that 
researchers have called for (Evans, 2011). We 
begin by briefly summarising the evolution of 
the region’s economy to establish its critical 
path dependencies, inherited economic legacies 
and socio-spatial structures.
Context
Wales is a devolved region in the UK with a 
population of just over 3 million people (5% 
of the UK total). It is often referred to as one 
of the constituent nations of the UK (along-
side England, Scotland and Northern Ireland) 
because of its distinctive culture and language. 
The Welsh economy has always been signifi-
cantly embedded in and shaped by the UK 
national economy, not least because of the 
strength of the economic and trade relationships 
across its border with England. Indeed, argu-
ably ‘Wales is not an economy’ inasmuch as 
the economies of north and south Wales are 
not integrated with each other but rather are 
each functionally connected in east–west links 
to neighbouring English regions.1 Wales is nev-
ertheless characterised by a distinctive set of 
economic characteristics and challenges.
From the mid-1970s, Wales has faced mas-
sive de-industrialisation with a continuous 
decline in heavy industry, culminating in the 
virtual disappearance of coal mining in the 
1980s. Owing to its high dependence upon 
manufacturing, the early 1980s recession had 
a bigger impact in Wales than in other parts 
of the UK: between 1979 and 1982, Wales lost 
130,000 jobs and the employment rate fell to 
62%. Recovery also started later in Wales, and 
structural changes left a legacy of high unem-
ployment and economic inactivity among older 
men, especially in the South Wales Valleys 
(Beatty and Fothergill, 2011). However, Wales 
has considerable capacities for self-determina-
tion having had its own devolved government 
with limited (but progressively expanding) 
powers over economic development since 1999. 
Devolution was intended to capture the eco-
nomic dividend widely perceived to ensue from 
the decentralisation of power and the capacity 
to develop more regionally attuned economic 
development policies through a distinctively 
‘Made in Wales’ approach (CBI Wales, 2002). 
As such, one of the most distinctive strategic 
developments of the early period of the Welsh 
Government was its decision to execute a ‘bon-
fire of the quangos’ and democratise the Welsh 
Development Agency (WDA) by bringing it 
under Welsh Government control. This has 
been widely critiqued as promoting a period 
of debilitating institutional churn within the 
region and signalling the onset of a more statist, 
precautionary and risk-averse approach to eco-
nomic development policy (see Bristow, 2013).
One of the most defining characteristics of the 
Welsh economy when looked at in an evolution-
ary perspective is its enduring dependence on 
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external and often cost-sensitive investment. This 
continued throughout the post-war period and 
the decline of coal and steel, with Wales secur-
ing significant UK public and private investment 
to update and modernise its industrial equip-
ment (Matthias, 1969). It also continued in the 
period of de-industrialisation in the 1970s and 
1980s when Wales secured more Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) than any part of the UK as a 
result of its relatively low wages and attractive 
packages of business support provided by the 
Welsh Development Agency (WDA). Between 
1979 and 1991, Wales attracted 14% of all FDI 
flowing into the UK, and by 1992 30% of all 
Welsh manufacturing employees were working 
in foreign-owned plants. As a consequence, the 
Welsh economy grew faster than any other part 
of the UK between 1986 and 1990 (Welsh Affairs 
Select Committee, 2013). The foreign-owned 
plants were, however, typically highly foot-
loose, capital-light operations which were highly 
mobile and indeed, during the 1990s this invest-
ment progressively left Wales as falling transport 
costs and the opening up of new markets in the 
expanding European Union, made the region 
a less attractive investment opportunity. Whole 
manufacturing plants moved away as manufac-
turers searched for cheaper locations such that 
by 2009, Wales had fallen from the best to the 
worst-performing region for attracting inward 
investment (Welsh Affairs Select Committee, 
2013).
A further defining feature of the Welsh 
economy’s evolution is the extent to which it 
is becoming less rather than more diversified 
over time. This is evident particularly in terms 
of traded exports where a steady decline in 
exports among relatively light manufactured 
goods has been compensated for by rising 
exports of heavy engineering and manufactured 
goods, particularly power-generating equip-
ment and iron and steel (NEF (New Economics 
Foundation), 2013). Wales still suffers from an 
earlier prior dependence upon a limited set of 
heavy and extractive industries—the so-called 
‘fatal nexus’ of coal, steel and iron—albeit 
that this dependence is now much weaker. 
Moreover, these exporters are typically owned 
by companies outside of Wales. As such, Wales’ 
relative success in exporting has not translated 
directly into increased domestic capacity to 
invest. Furthermore, the economy has increased 
its dependence upon the public sector (through 
attraction of European structural funding and 
major public sector employers), which now 
accounts for over one-third of all jobs. With low 
activity rates and a high-dependent population, 
the Welsh economy is now heavily dependent 
upon fiscal transfers from the UK national gov-
ernment with a higher dependence on the wel-
fare state than any other part of the UK (NEF 
(New Economics Foundation), 2013).
This is reflected in overall prosperity levels. 
Wales has witnessed the long-term decline of 
its per capita Gross Domestic Product from 
around 85% of the UK average in the late 
1980s to around 80% by 2000. Using Gross 
Value Added (GVA),2 Wales entered the recent 
economic crisis as the poorest region within the 
UK. Indeed, by 2011 Wales’s GVA was 24.8% 
below the UK average. In 2011, Welsh output 
was 44% lower than that of London with GVA 
per head in Wales standing at £15,696 com-
pared to a figure of £35,638 in London.
Arguably, the relatively low level of GVA 
per capita in Wales is not surprising given its 
lack of large cities or substantial economic 
agglomerations, a demographic profile char-
acterised by a high (particularly elderly) 
dependent population and the relatively low 
skills base of the workforce.3 Indeed, various 
reports and studies during the period leading 
up the crisis highlighted the persistent problem 
of low economic activity rates, and lower skills 
and productivity levels in Wales (for example, 
Hudson, 2008; Welsh Assembly Government 
Economic Research Advisory Panel, 2006). 
Thus, the crisis hit an economy already facing 
the considerable challenges associated with 
the legacy of industrial decay and decline and 
the need to re-skill and revitalise many of its 
communities.
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Crisis responses
The recent history of economic decline in Wales 
is such that the post-2007 crisis arguably had a 
less devastating impact on the psyche of many 
of those living and working in Wales than might 
have been the case for other European regions. 
This is indeed supported by evidence on the 
impact of the recession on the former coal-
field community of Gellideg in Merthyr Tydfil. 
One resident, when asked about the impact of 
the current recession replied “Recession, what 
recession? Economic and social depression is 
a constant state of life here” (Day, 2009, 10), 
reflecting the community’s ongoing struggle 
with generational unemployment. This sense 
that communities and households entered the 
current crisis somewhat inured to recessionary 
shocks is such that a representative from the 
Welsh Government observed “this hasn’t felt 
like a big crisis. There hasn’t really been a big 
external shock that has led to a seismic change 
in people’s attitudes or behaviour. The change 
is incremental. There has been gradual adapta-
tion and adjustment with no big correction in 
house prices or change in expectations. People 
here are a bit desensitised to recession”.4 As such, 
economic crisis and dependency upon external 
support or public subsidy have become some-
thing of a normalcy, creating a context within 
which the adaptive agency of households and 
communities is distinctively weak and ostensi-
bly reactive.
Furthermore, there is evidence that house-
hold agency has been shaped by co-evolution-
ary interactions with firms and policy makers. 
The most distinctive feature of the recent eco-
nomic crisis compared to previous crises in the 
UK has been the differential performance of 
employment and output. While UK output fell 
by 6% between 2008 and 2010 (which repre-
sented a performance markedly worse than in 
past recessions), the loss of employment was 
much smaller at some 3% of the initial level. 
Furthermore, the period over which employ-
ment fell was much shorter than in the past 
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010).
There is evidence that this pattern of labour 
market adjustment has been significantly more 
pronounced in Wales than any other part of the 
UK. Sensier and Artis (2014) demonstrate that 
the employment cycle in Wales entered reces-
sion 1 year earlier than other nations in the UK 
in 2007, and emerged from the recession in 2009 
before Scotland in 2010. While employment fell 
by 2.3% over this period, there is clear evidence 
that this fall in employment was significantly 
tempered by the strategies deployed by busi-
nesses, households and policy makers during 
this period. Instead of redundancy, there was 
an increase in part-time working and accept-
ance of reduced, or zero hours contracts as well 
as lower rates of pay. Total annual pay fell by 
8.1% in Wales between 2007 and 2012, com-
pared with a 7.5% fall across the UK as a whole 
(TUC, 2013). Moreover, underemployment 
rose to an unprecedented scale—a measure 
of the number of people who want more work 
than is available to them—indicative of both a 
fall in real wages and reduction in hours avail-
able. Underemployment as a percentage of the 
workforce is higher in Wales where in 2012 an 
estimated 134,000 people desired longer work-
ing hours (Bell and Blanchflower, 2013).
The Welsh Government played a key role 
in establishing a strategy and norm of employ-
ment retention as a response to the crisis and 
spreading this across all economic agents 
through its consensual politics and institutional 
leadership. A  policy of labour subsidies was 
one of the outcomes of a series of eight Welsh 
Economic Summits facilitated by the Welsh 
Government in the wake of the economic cri-
sis. These were intended to involve a breadth of 
stakeholders from local authorities, businesses, 
social partners and community representatives, 
in the development of crisis responses. The 
Welsh Government’s ReACT II initiative was 
launched in the immediate aftermath of the 
crash. The original ReACT scheme, developed 
in utilised part-funding from the EU to assist 
newly employed individuals looking to retrain. 
However, in 2008 the emergency Economic 
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Summits led to the creation of ReACT II. 
The enhanced scheme provided grant support 
to employers taking on recently unemployed 
individuals, with funding provided to support 
the new employees’ wages for 4  months (up 
to £2080), and pay for training over a 6-month 
period. Nearly 16,000 people subsequently 
entered the scheme, with 11,000 leaving at a 
cost of £24 million (CRG, 2008).
More innovative was the ProAct initiative, 
also launched in October 2008. This provided 
part-funding for businesses that had intro-
duced short-term working for employees, the 
expectation being that once economic condi-
tions improved, they would benefit from the 
retention of skilled workers and their specific 
on-the-job knowledge. It offered support for 
training costs of up to £2000 per individual, 
along with a wage subsidy for up to 12 months 
of up to £2000 (£50 per day) per individual dur-
ing training. This focus on training meant that 
workers remained engaged with the workplace. 
Some 10,675 employees were supported under 
the programme at a cost of £27 million and are 
widely regarded as having worked well in Wales 
(Cambridge Policy Consultants, 2011).
There is strong evidence to suggest that, 
firms across a range of business types, sectors 
and parts of Wales took on board this approach 
to employment retention in that they have 
exhibited a much stronger inclination to hold 
onto workers through this crisis rather than 
lay them off or make them redundant. A  sur-
vey of all local authorities across Wales in the 
midst of the crisis found evidence of labour 
hoarding across many businesses and author-
ity areas (WLGA (Welsh Local Government 
Association), 2009). There were a number 
of reasons identified for this behaviour. For 
many firms, the shake-out had already hap-
pened prior to the crisis (WLGA (Welsh Local 
Government Association), 2009)—further evi-
dence of the important influence of previous 
crises and their legacy effects. Local authori-
ties however also reported that initially, greater 
dependence on public sector employment in 
Wales shielded the economy from the recession 
and provided a degree of stability and confi-
dence through it. Furthermore, in the midst of 
the crisis, very few local authorities cut back 
their own employment to any significant extent 
and many stressed that proposed reductions in 
headcount could be achieved through natural 
wastage rather than redundancy. Many posts 
were also protected by virtue of their being 
in service areas such as regeneration and eco-
nomic development which were on fixed-term, 
funding-related contracts. It is likely of course 
that this picture will have changed subsequently 
as austerity measures have required more sub-
stantive public sector contraction.
There is also some evidence of labour hoard-
ing particularly in small and micro-businesses 
which are becoming more of the mainstay of 
many local economies across Wales (WLGA 
(Welsh Local Government Association), 2009). 
Membership organisations reported that small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) tended 
to hold on to labour through this crisis although 
this needs to be corroborated by firmer survey 
and quantitative evidence.5 Indigenous firms 
and independents, particularly important to the 
economies of many small market towns and 
rural parts of Wales, also demonstrated a strong 
tendency to pursue business strategies defined 
more clearly by the objectives of stability and 
mid- to long-term survival than expansion or 
growth. For many of these firms, their strategies 
for sustaining employment through a crisis are 
premised upon the close-knit working relation-
ships they have developed with their local pop-
ulations. Here, strong social ties exist between 
communities and local traders who are seen 
as playing vital role in providing a service and 
contributing to local economic vitality. Their 
dominant values are thus defined in terms of an 
appreciation of their autonomy, a high degree 
of attachment to place and an emotional invest-
ment in both workers and the local community 
(Heley et al., 2012).
Perhaps not surprisingly in this context, 
workers in Wales appear to have been much 
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more inclined to take pay cuts and accept 
reduced working hours during the crisis than 
become unemployed. With an already challeng-
ing labour market and crisis-induced austerity 
measures leading to significant changes in wel-
fare provision, they appear to have had little 
choice in this regard. Survey data collected as 
part of the 2012 Skills and Employment Survey 
further supports the evidence that workforce 
reductions have been much less prominent in 
Wales than the rest of the UK and that employ-
ers in Wales have responded differently to the 
crisis. There is also evidence that Wales has 
exhibited the highest rate of increase of any UK 
region in the perceived costs associated with 
job loss, leading many workers to report that 
it would be difficult to find alternative employ-
ment. As a consequence, staying in ‘any’ job is 
preferable to no job at all. Notably however, 
workers in Wales reported significantly higher 
levels of confidence about their prospects of job 
security with only one in five expressing a belief 
that there was some chance of them losing their 
jobs in the foreseeable future, compared with 
one in three workers in London and the South 
East (Felstead et al., 2013).
What is clear however is that employment 
responses to the crisis in Wales can be character-
ised as a short-term, reactive form of coping—
trying to maintain or quickly recover existing 
levels of employment and job security (if not 
household income)—rather than develop more 
progressive or transformative strategies for 
change. All economic agents have demonstrated 
weak agency in this regard. This argument is lent 
credence by the Welsh Government’s strategic 
shift from ‘green’ and low carbon economic 
development agenda to one more pragmati-
cally accommodating all energy development 
(including nuclear power, new gas power sta-
tions or other fossil fuel facilities). Spending 
cuts and the crisis have conspired with prevail-
ing precautionary imperatives to propel greater 
emphasis upon the immediacy of a job dividend 
than progress towards its longer-term sustain-
able development obligations and aspirations. 
The trade-offs between economy and environ-
ment undoubtedly ‘bite a bit more in the cri-
sis’.6 Clearly, of course, small, transformative 
change could be in place but is difficult to see 
as yet, making longer-term evaluation of crisis 
responses an important imperative.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper has sought to develop a CAS per-
spective to understand how agents respond to 
economic crisis within regions. It has argued that 
a CAS perspective provides a useful framework 
for understanding change processes in regional 
economies and, in particular, understanding the 
nature of collective agency in the messy com-
plexity of regional economies and the signifi-
cance of understanding agency as a recursive, 
adaptive notion relating to the opportunities 
and capacity for purposeful action, as well as 
understandings of available choices and risks 
of agents in their co-evolutionary and path-
dependent context.
This plea for a greater appreciation of the 
importance of agency in processes of regional 
economic adaptation and change is manifestly 
not new, and scholars developing the institu-
tionalist paradigm in regional development in 
particular have long asserted the importance 
of understanding the social foundations of 
economic behaviour, particularly in its collec-
tive forms. Thus, for example, in 1995 Storper 
(Storper, 1995, 49)  emphasised the impor-
tance of understanding how “reflexive col-
lective action unfolds” in regional economies. 
Furthermore in 1999 when emphasising the 
critical need for policy communities to develop 
“the ability to evolve in order to adapt” (1999; 
372), Amin highlighted the central importance 
of “the ability of actor-networks to develop an 
external gaze and sustain a culture of strate-
gic management and co-ordination in order 
to foresee opportunities and secure rapid 
response”.
However, CAS thinking is particularly 
valuable in illuminating the importance of 
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co-evolutionary behaviour and choices in shap-
ing adaptive agency within regions in response 
to crises. It helps illuminate how crises and 
change processes are mediated collectively by 
agents and their interactions both with each 
other and their context, and how these are 
shaped by past choices and prevailing norms 
and expectations. As such, it provides a frame-
work which is less static and linear to explore 
the interactive effects and drivers of change 
within regional economies. We utilise the case 
of Wales—a devolved region which is continu-
ing to display the legacy of de-industrialisa-
tion—to highlight how CAS can be deployed to 
understand crisis responses of agents and their 
contingent, co-evolutionary development. We 
focus on employment responses to the recent 
economic crisis by households, firms and policy 
makers and argue that these responses have 
co-evolved in a distinctive way. The historically 
weak positioning of the region in economic 
and political hierarchies, its legacy of industrial 
decline, its dependency culture and its fledg-
ing and increasingly less diverse yet consensual 
institutional capacities, appear to have worked 
together to create a dominant short-term, reac-
tive form of agency—one characterised as 
‘getting by’—rather than a more reflexive inter-
rogation of the desirability of the status quo 
and the need for and means of pursuing longer 
term, more transformative change.
This in turn provides for important critical 
reflections upon the concept of resilience. The 
case of Wales usefully highlights the adaptive 
capacities of the region’s actors in the short 
term when confronted with an economic crisis 
inasmuch as it reveals their ability to find ways 
of coping with ongoing economic change and 
maintaining job security. However, this does 
not necessarily provide evidence of resilience 
inasmuch as these skills in adapting or cop-
ing in the short term do not necessarily pro-
vide future resistance to crises and/or success 
in improving economic and social outcomes 
over the longer term. In this regard, it implies 
the need to distinguish more carefully between 
the short-term adaptive capacities of popula-
tions in a region and the longer-term resilience 
of their production and livelihood systems. 
Neither does it remove the importance of 
understanding the political economic realities 
and institutional landscape out-with the region 
which frame agents’ scope for action. As such, it 
implies the need to better understand the inter-
active effects and drivers of adaptive capacities 
and resilience at multiple levels.
All of this indicates that further detailed 
empirical work is required in a number of key 
areas. Firstly, there is a need for more analysis 
to relate the evidence garnered on the agen-
das and adaptations to the crisis reported 
here, with detailed analysis of the resilience 
of the economy in performance (for example, 
output) terms (Bristow and Healy, 2014). The 
Welsh case also raises questions about what is 
needed to ensure that co-evolutionary adaptive 
responses become biased towards proactive 
rather than simply reactive responses. While 
the labour subsidies supported by the Welsh 
Government appear to have been valuable in 
encouraging employment retention through 
the crisis, questions surround the extent to 
which they have encouraged businesses to 
engage in long-term adaptation to the chang-
ing contours of the global economy. Similar 
labour subsidy schemes have been deployed 
in other European nations and regions, such 
as in Germany. Cross-comparative work on 
the effects of these schemes and how these 
have played out in different socio-spatial con-
texts and with different policy framings, mind 
sets and crisis narratives (for example, whether 
as more long-termist approaches rather than 
short-term stop-gaps), would be interesting, as 
would more critical reflection on the terms on 
which localism is being mobilised in contempo-
rary political discourses around austerity.
Notwithstanding this, CAS thinking usefully 
highlights how adaptive agency functions in 
complex systems and its significance in mediat-
ing crisis effects. It also opens up new possibili-
ties in thinking about both the challenge of, and 
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the potential for, effecting more transformative 
change, highlighting the need for analysts and 
practitioners alike to better understand the 
complex and contingent web of interrelation-
ships and interdependencies in regions through 
which adaptive agency plays out.
Indeed, the evidence here does suggest there 
is value in exploring co-evolutionary patterns 
of agency in crisis responses in regions. There 
does appear to be strong evidence from this 
case study that firms, workers and policy mak-
ers develop co-evolutionary responses as they 
learn about the crisis and its effects, undertake 
formal and informal dialogue with each other, 
and learn from the experience of past crises and 
policy experiments. Clearly there is more work 
to be done in unpacking the nature of these 
relationships, establishing exactly how they 
unfold, the critical networks at play and, more 
especially, the factors which enable the devel-
opment of positive collective mindsets, and pur-
posive, goal-oriented adaptations which build 
transformative resilience as well as perhaps 
greater understanding of when, where and why 
agents are non-adaptive and resistant to change. 
This represents an exciting research agenda and 
it is hoped that this paper has, in part at least, 
contributed to opening up this task.
Endnotes
1 Interview with Welsh Government (BETS), 24 
January 2013.
2 GVA is the value generated by any unit engaged in 
a production activity. It is measured at current basic 
prices, excluding taxes (less subsidies) on produc-
tion. GVA plus taxes (less subsidies) on production 
is equivalent to Gross Domestic Product.
3 Interview with Welsh Government (BETS), 24 
January 2013.
4 Interview with Welsh Government (BETS), 3 April 
2013.
5 Interview with the Federation of Small Businesses 
in Wales, 13 May 2013.
6 Interview with Welsh Government (BETS), 24 
January 2013.
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